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THE MORALITY OF PROPERTY
THOMAS W. MERRILL* AND HENRY E. SMITH**

INTRODUCTION
The relationship between property and morality has been
obscured by three elements in our intellectual tradition. First is the
assumption, which can be traced to Bentham, that property is a
pure creature of law.' An institution assumed to be wholly dependent on law for its existence is unlikely to be infused with strong
moral content. Second is the related tradition, also Benthamite, of
examining questions about property law from a utilitarian perspective.2 Utilitarianism is, of course, a moral theory. But in its modern
applications, based on price theory and cost-benefit analysis, it
adopts a framework largely indifferent to questions of individual
rights and distributive justice, which many consider the hallmarks
of a moral perspective. Third is the tradition, stronger perhaps in
academic circles than in popular thought, that associates property
with immorality. Starting with Proudhon's slogan that "property is
theft,"' and building through Marx and Engels with their call for the
abolition of private property,4 this tradition has put property on the
Charles Keller Beekman Professor of Law, Columbia Law School.
Fred A. Johnston Professor of Property and Environmental Law, Yale Law School. For
comments and discussions, the authors would like to thank Eric Claeys, Robert Ellickson,
James Gordley, Eric Posner, Arthur Ripstein, and participants in the Conference on Law and
Morality at the William and Mary School of Law. All errors are ours.
1. As Bentham put it, "Property and law are born together, and die together. Before laws
were made there was no property; take away laws, and property ceases." JEREMY BENTHAM,
*

**

THEORY OF LEGISLATION 111-13 (C.K. Ogden ed., Richard Hildreth trans., Harcourt, Brace &
Co. 1931) (1802).

2. Id. at 1-4.
3. PIERRE-JOSEPH PROUDHON, WHAT IS PROPERTY? 13 (Donald R. Kelley & Bonnie G.
Smith eds. & trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1994) (1840).
4. KARL MARX & FREDERICK ENGELS, THE COMMUNIST MANIFESTO: A MODERN EDITION
52 (Verso 1998) (1848) ("[The theory of the Communists may be summed up in the single
sentence: Abolition of private property.").
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defensive in the minds of those drawn to thinking of public policy in
moral terms.
This Essay seeks to challenge the conventional wisdom that
dissociates property and morality. We hope to establish two
propositions. First, no system of property rights can survive unless
property ownership is infused with moral significance. By this, we
mean that the differentiating feature of a system of property-the
right of the owner to act as the exclusive gatekeeper of the owned
thing-must be regarded as a moral right; intentional violations of
this right, either by unlicensed invasions of owned things or
unconsented takings of owned things, must be regarded as immoral
acts. Second, the modern American legal system, at least with
respect to this core aspect of property, does in fact adopt such a
moral perspective.
Our claims are based on the following fundamental aspects of
property: Property is a device for coordinating both personal and
impersonal interactions over things. Consequently, property rights
must be communicated to a wide and disparate group of potential
violators; these rights are in rem.5 Because property rights need to
coordinate the behavior of large numbers of unconnected people,
they must be easily comprehended and must resist possible
misinterpretation. Law, including criminal prosecution and civil
enforcement actions, is almost certainly inadequate to achieve this
degree of coordination and compliance. Self-help, such as erecting
fences and hiring guards, is also too feeble to assure the required
degree of near-universal respect for property rights. Property can
function as property only if the vast preponderance of persons
recognize that property is a moral right, and this requirement has
important consequences for the study of property.
For property to serve as an in rem coordination device, the
morality upon which it rests must be simple and accessible to all
members of the community. We do not attempt here to outline any
theory of the origins of property. We do argue that the imperative
of in rem coordination places significant constraints on the kind of
morality upon which property must rest. Again, we do not offer any
fully developed theory of the content of such a morality. But it
5. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of
Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle,110 YALE L.J. 1, 8 (2000).
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seems highly unlikely that such a morality will be captured by many
forms of utilitarianism. Pragmatism is too uncertain, and casespecific cost-benefit analysis too demanding and error-prone, to
supply the kind of robust and widely accepted moral understanding
needed to sustain a system of property.
Because the type of morality that will support a system of
property rights must be suitable for all members of the community,
to say that the essential quality of property is captured by the
familiar metaphor of the bundle of sticks is also implausible. When
it comes to the public definition of property rights, the metaphor
implies that the content of property rights continually mutates from
one context to the next as legislatures and courts add new sticks to
the bundle and take others out. Such a process would make
impossible the maintenance of a system of simple moral duties
comprehensible to all. Likewise, if the core of property law must rest
on a simple foundation of everyday morality, property is unlikely to
be wholly the creature of law. If we are right about the necessary
connection between property and morality, then Bentham is almost
certainly wrong that property arises wholly from law.6
Human rights, including rights of bodily security and integrity,
are another realm in which rights are widely held not to be wholly
dependent for their existence on the state. We will argue that
property rights and human rights have much more in common than
is often supposed. In particular, both types of rights are "in rem," in
the sense that they create corresponding obligations of noninterference on a very large and unspecified mass of dutyholders. 7
Moreover, given the communication problems associated with
creating and maintaining such large-scale duties, the content of the
respective rights must remain correspondingly simple. "No punching" is the direct analogue of "No taking."
If property is grounded in simple moral principles recognized by
all members of society, then one can say property is immoral only by
standing outside the existing social system. This stance, of course,
is characteristic of the socialist revolutionaries who have excoriated

6. BENTHAM, supra note 1, at 111.
7. See J.E. PENNER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY IN LAW 29-30 (1997) (defining in rem duties
and rights).
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property: they typically have been outsiders seeking to overthrow
the existing social order.
We do not offer the in rem nature of property rights as a theory
of the morality of property. But recognizing the features of morality
that make possible a system of in rem rights helps explain the
relationship of morality and property. Nor do we claim that the
traditional everyday morality that supports property extends to the
refinements required when we move beyond simple exclusion rights
and in rem dutyholders. Beyond the core of property, the simple
robust morality supporting exclusion rights gives way to more
pragmatic situational morality. In these more rarified contexts,
decision makers can afford to let other moral considerations in,
including the case-by-case pragmatism characteristic of modern
utilitarianism, if so desired. At least the communicative cost
constraints from core property do not stand in the way.
Part I of this Essay will consider the relation of property and
morality in general. We will argue that, as in the case of human and
civil rights, the in rem nature of property rights requires support
from very simple and robust moral intuitions. To coordinate
expectations among unconnected people through the mediating
device of a thing, property must draw on a type of morality that
calls for more than pragmatic balancing. In Part II we consider a
number of areas of property law that illustrate the role moral
intuitions and condemnation play in modern American property
law. Part III will consider how situational morality plays a role in
refinements to the core exclusionary regime of property law. We also
argue that these refinements are just that-refinements-and do
not undermine the need for the morally grounded exclusion rights
at the core of property.
I. MORALITY AND IN REM RIGHTS
In this Part, we argue that the critical feature of property
rights-that they are in rem rights imposing duties of abstention on
all other members of the relevant community-requires that
property rights be regarded as moral rights. The nature of property
as a coordination device among unconnected and anonymous actors,
mediated through stereotyped things, requires that property rights

20071

MORALITY OF PROPERTY

1853

command widespread respect. This respect can only be provided by
some version of morality that treats violations of possession, theft,
trespasses, and other gross interferences with property as wrongs
subject to widespread disapprobation. This moral code-whatever
its origins and whatever its justification-is backstopped by criminal and civil legal enforcement and by self-help. But it is implausible to imagine that legal enforcement or self-help, either alone or in
combination, is sufficient to sustain a system of property rights
without such a system of morality.
A. The Moral Nature of In Rem Rights
Property rights, like human rights such as rights of personal
security, face a general structural challenge if they are to get up and
running. Both property rights and human rights are "in rem" or
"good against the world." The in rem nature of such rights means all
actors in the relevant community must recognize that they are
subject to a duty to abstain from interfering with such rights insofar
as they are held by any other member of the community. This
generalized duty, in turn, creates an enormous information cost and
collective action problem. The rights must be defined in such a way
that their attributes can be easily understood by a huge number of
persons of diverse experience and intellectual skills.' The identity
of the persons who hold such rights must be capable of communication by signals that can be immediately grasped and processed by
an equally large multitude.
Take, by way of illustration, property rights in automobiles. In
modern society, certainly in urban areas, thousands of automobiles
circulate about and are parked here and there. Each auto is owned
by someone-a single person, perhaps a couple, perhaps a corporation. The owners generally succeed in keeping track of and identifying their own cars. But most of the time virtually no one knows the
identity of the owners of all the thousands of other cars they see on
the streets and in parking lots. In order to maintain a semblance of
8. See, e.g., Merrill & Smith, supra note 5, at 24-40 (analyzing the need for
standardization in the law of property); Henry E. Smith, The Language of Property: Form,
Context, and Audience, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1105, 1115 (2003) (discussing the importance of
simplification of language in the law of possession).
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stability in this system, not only must each owner recognize and
exercise dominion over his own car, but virtually all members of
society--owners and nonowners alike-must recognize and respect
the unique claims of owners to their own particular auto. In other
words, virtually everyone must recognize and consider themselves
bound by general duties not to interfere with autos that they know
are owned by some anonymous other.
How is it that such a system of universal in rem duties of
abstention gets up and running and is sustained thereafter? The
legal system is one possible answer. Invading or taking other
people's property can be made a crime, and police resources can be
devoted to investigating and prosecuting property crimes. Invading
or taking other people's property can be made a tort, and courts can
hear cases by aggrieved property owners and issue injunctions and
damage awards against violators. Despite these possibilities, it is
doubtful that law alone can generate and sustain a system of in
rem duties of abstention. For one thing, when legal protection of
property is out of sync with common morality, we often see widespread disregard of legally recognized property rights. This was true
of mining claims on federal lands in California in the nineteenth
century,' and is true of downloading copyrighted material from the
Web today. 10 For another thing, we often see that formal legal
protection of property is quite modest, both in terms of the severity
of sanctions and the frequency of enforcement actions. Yet if the
right in question corresponds with common morality, it can be
highly secure even with minimal legal enforcement. This is true, for
example, with respect to trespass to land or baby strollers left at the
entrances to stores.
We are not suggesting that law does not matter. Spontaneous
looting sometimes breaks out when the police are perceived to be
out of commission, perhaps because of a power outage. And legal
actions, whether criminal or civil, can perform educative or
"preference-shaping" functions. 1 Thus, law unquestionably per
9. See GARY D. LIBECAP, CONTRACTING FOR PROPERTY RIGHTS 36-37 (1989).
10. See generally Richard Swope, Comment, Peer-to-Peer File Sharing and Copyright
Infringement: DangerAhead for Individuals Sharing Files on the Internet, 44 SANTA CLARA
L. REV. 861 (2004).

11. See, e.g., Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, An Economic Analysis of the Criminal Law as a
Preference-ShapingPolicy, 1990 DUKE L.J. 1, 38 (noting that the preference-shaping function
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forms a backstopping role in sustaining a system of in rem duties.
Our only point is that it cannot do the job alone.
Another possible source of support for in rem duties is self-help. 2
Self-help is also unlikely, however, to support a system of property
rights by itself. To return to the automobile example, self-help
measures such as locks, alarms, anti-theft devices like "the Club,"
and using guarded parking lots, undoubtedly are important in
securing property rights in cars. But these devices work best when
the percentage of car thieves in the community is small, and most
people will call the police when they see someone smashing a
window of a parked car. Indeed, we find that even in small-group
settings with no formal property rights, third-party enforcement is
crucial in maintaining stable allocations of resources. 3 Moreover,
the very process of using self-help is governed by moral norms. An
owner needs to know when and how much to retaliate against an
invader, which requires widely shared norms. Otherwise, things can
get quickly out of control and descend into a Hobbesian war of all
against all.
Solving such a complicated and massive coordination problem
places some constraints on the type of morality that grounds
property. Rights to exclude others from a thing must be grounded in
robust moral notions that are easy to communicate and shared by
the relevant members of the population. There is a range of possible
sources for such robust moral rules, and we do not make an
argument for which one of these is best. The rules could come from
a widely shared deontological theory, or from theories that agree on
the relevant property questions. Or they could be conventions that
depend on some combination of public utility and human psychology. Hume, for example, argued that property comes about when
contiguous possessors of valued things come to recognize the
advantages of mutually forbearing from interfering with each
of criminal law helps explain which conduct is punished and the significance of intent in
imposing liability).
12. See Henry E. Smith, Self-Help and the Nature of Property, 1 J.L. ECON. & POLy 69,
69 (2005) (naming self-help as a remedy that is "at the center of a system of property rights").
13. A vivid example is the Lobster gangs studied by James Acheson. See JAMES M.
ACHESON, THE LOBSTER GANGS OF MAINE (1988). This feature of third-party support is
important in the case studies described by Elinor Ostrom. See ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING
THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990).
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other's thing, and this habit of mutual forbearance spreads and
becomes conventional morality. 4 Some work by modern cognitive
scientists suggests that gross violations of property rights trigger
reactions in parts of the brain devoted to automatic emotions rather
than general reasoning, as opposed to more general impersonal
ethical problems.' 5 Still others have noticed the connection between
animal territoriality and the exclusionary aspect of property. 16 Any
of these sources could help explain how property rules take on the
generality, simplicity, and robustness necessary to coordinate basic
expectations of large numbers of interacting members of a community.
Indeed, for present purposes any moral theory that endorses
general, simple, and robust rules for core property situations,
especially those in which claims are being broadcast to the world at
large, would be consistent with our view of the relation of morality
to property law. Even some forms of utilitarianism or consequentialism of a fairly general sort could justify simple, robust rules
of property to which those making decisions of how to act could
respond quasi-automatically. The contours of core property rules
could be a genuine example of the "overlapping consensus" one
hears invoked so often in an era not exactly characterized by
consensus. 7 That being said, we will argue that the forms of
utilitarianism that undergird modern law and economics which
14. DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 314-15 (David Fate Norton & Mary J.
Norton eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2000) (1739).
15. See, e.g., Joshua D. Greene et al., An fMRI Investigation of EmotionalEngagement in
Moral Judgment, 293 SCIENCE 2105, 2106-07 (2001) (finding "increased emotional
engagement" in personal moral dilemmas than in impersonal moral dilemmas); Joshua
Greene & Jonathan Haidt, How (and Where) Does Moral Judgment Work?, 6 TRENDS IN
COGNITIVE SCI. 517,517 (2002) (describing the roles of reason and emotion in moral decisions,
in which "automatic emotional processes tend to dominate").
16. See, e.g., Jeffrey Evans Stake, The Property 'Instinct',359 PHIL. TRANS. R. Soc. LOND.
VIa. SCI. 1763, 1764 (2004), available at http://www.journals.royalsoc.ac.uk/media/6cc6l52
vtp3wvl47qu5mcontributions/r//b/4/rj64b902wupym0yw.pdf (comparing the first-in-time,
first-in-right property rule with the natural ownership rules of species of butterflies); Peter
C. Mayer, Property Rights and Resource Management Among Nonhuman Species 1 (Am. L.
& Econ. Ass'n Paper No. 47, 2005), available at http://law.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article= 1485&context=alea (discussing"the correspondence between animal territoriality and
human property rights").
17. See, e.g., JOHNRAWLs, POLITICALLIBERALISM 133-72 (1993) (discussing the coexistence
of unity and pluralism in a stable society).
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assume a degree of plasticity of property and have underplayed the
information and coordination problems present in core property
situations are inconsistent with the nature of the rights in
question.'"
Whatever their source, property rules and the moral rules that
support them must be simple and general, at least as to the core of
property. If the rules for determining access to and use of resources
required the gathering of detailed information-for example,
information about the attributes of rival claimants that might
otherwise have moral relevance-this would not produce the
stability of expectation needed for widespread coordination. 9
Standards incorporating detailed information would also present a
temptation for each person to interpret the standard in his own
favor.20 A standard with too many complexities would give rise to
opportunistic claims of miscalculation. In contrast, if the core of
property is the simple right of an owner to exclude the world from
the resource, 2' the behavior of each actor will be easy to predict:
people will comply most of the time, and telling what compliance
is-and, more importantly, is not-will be easy.
We will return to some evidence for the role of morality in
property in Part II, but consider first two topics central to any
18. The structure of our argument here is reminiscent of W.D. Ross's antiutilitarianism
in its reliance on the way people actually think, and we, like Ross, remain skeptical that the
nature and full presumptive force of rules like "Thou shalt not steal" really are captured fully
by their consequences. See W.D. Ross, THE RIGHT AND THE GOOD 41-47 (1930). But again, this
does not mean that core property rules cannot be analyzed fruitfully and justified using
consequentialism or even utilitarianism.
19. Hume's "convention, concerning abstinence from possession of others" rested on the
assurance that men, after realizing and communicating their common interest in property
rules, would continue to, and expect others to, regulate their conduct according to those rules.
HUME, supra note 14, at 315-16, 322-23.
20. See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Human Nature and the Best Consequentialist
Moral System 11-12 (Harv. Law Sch. Ctr. for Law, Econ. & Bus., Discussion Paper No. 349,
2002), availableat http://ssrn.com/abstract=304384 ("Ifan individual would like to be able to
lie, because it promotes his narrow self-interest, he would like to convince himself that it
would be moral to do so ...
[and] if moral rules are complex, admitting myriad context-specific
exceptions, the capacity to rationalize and misperceive pertinent information makes it likely
that individuals would frequently err in favor of their own self-interest.").
21. For various approaches taking the right to exclude as basic, see PENNER, supra note
7, at 29-30,71; Thomas W. Merrill, Essay, Propertyand the Right To Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV.
730, 737-39 (1998); and Henry E. Smith, Exclusion Versus Governance: Two Strategies for
DelineatingProperty Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S453 (2002).
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system of property that must loom large in any discussion of the
morality of property.
1. Possession
What counts as possession is important for getting particular
property rights started and for grounding the entire system of
property.2 2 Property can be regarded as a robust right to possess
over time; ultimately the right to exclude is the right to determine
who can possess the thing in question.23 Hume argued that people
make associations in their minds between themselves and the
things they possess.2 4 Rules making nearness and physical control
the criteria for possession have a psychological basis, and the
convention of respecting possession stems from people's mutual
expectations that they will respect the right to control these
things. 25 Building on Hume's convention-based account, Robert
Sugden has shown that possession can be modeled by a simple game
in which players, when challenged, fight if they are in possession
and defer if they are not in possession. 26 This "possession" or
"bourgeois" convention is an evolutionarily stable strategy. The
opposite strategy-always defer when challenged-would also be
stable, but might not be as useful or as salient. Personhood and
autonomy theories also point,to the importance of certain core cases
of possession. Like Hume's and Sugden's possession convention,
personhood theories stress proximity and control and hence
possession; for example, Hegel's self-actualization can occur through
possession of the thing. 27 And the sphere of autonomy starts with
22. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Possessionas the Root of Title, 13 GA. L. REV. 1221, 122124 (1979); Dean Lueck, First Possession as the Basis of Property, in PROPERTY RIGHTS:
COOPERATION, CONFLICT, AND LAW 200, 200 (Terry L. Anderson & Fred S. McChesney eds.,
2003); Carol M. Rose, Possessionas the Origin of Property,52 U. CHI. L. REV. 73, 73-75, 77-79
(1985); Smith, supra note 8, at 1115-25.
23. Se', e.g., Rose, supra note 22, at 77 (citing Blackstone for the proposition that
possession requires acts evincing "a declarationof one's intent to appropriate").
24. HUME, supranote 14, at 323-24 & n.71.
25. Id. at 311-24.
26. ROBERT SUGDEN, THE ECONOMICS OF RIGHTS, CO-OPERATION, AND WELFARE 153-59

(1986). Once the rules of the game are established, everyone's best interest is to follow them.
See id. at 155-56.
27. G.W.F. HEGEL, ELEMENTS OFTHE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT § 51 (Allen W. Wood ed., H.B.
Nisbet trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991) (1821) ("My inner idea [Vorstellung] and will that
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the space closest to the person. Related rights of the person, like the
right to be free from offensive contact under battery, extend to
objects that are closely related to a person's body.2"
Related to possession is the first-in-time rule. Again, first-in-time
is a simple rule and one which most people pick up as a matter of
everyday morality in childhood. Like other simple moral rules, first
possession can come into conflict with other moral rules. For
example, first-in-time in some scenarios can lead to excessive
competition, which is regarded as wasteful.2 9 Such conflict does not
make first-in-time any less of a grounding for the basics of property;
rather, the conflict in these cases requires refinements for highstakes situations, especially those in which a clear winner cannot be
expected to emerge early.
Importantly for our purposes, the rules of possession are quite
general. It takes fairly high stakes or a high degree of personal
something should be mine is not enough to constitute property;, ... on the contrary, this
requires that I should take possession of it. The existence which my willing thereby attains
includes its ability to be recognized by others."). In Radin's Hegelian personhood theory of
property, the criterion for personhood property is whether the person is so bound up with an
object that it helps constitute the person, and canonical examples (wedding rings, residences)
involve possession. Margaret Jane Radin, Propertyand Personhood,34 STAN. L. REV. 957,
959-61, 965-68 (1982).
28. The Second Restatement of Torts extends coverage to objects connected to the person
in a dignitary sense, which seems to imply possession, but not vice versa:
Since the essence of the plaintiffs grievance consists in the offense to the
dignity involved in the unpermitted and intentional invasion of the inviolability
of his person and not in any physical harm done to his body, it is not necessary
that the plaintiffs actual body be disturbed. Unpermitted and intentional
contacts with anything so connected with the body as to be customarily regarded
as part of the other's person and therefore as partaking of its inviolability is
actionable as an offensive contact with his person. There are some things such
as clothing or a cane or, indeed, anything directly grasped by the hand which are
so intimately connected with one's body as to be universally regarded as part of
the person. On the other hand, there may be things which are attached to one's
body with a connection so slight that they are not so regarded. The line of
distinction is very difficult to draw. It is a thing which is felt rather than one to
be defined, since it depends upon an emotional reaction.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 18 cmt. c (1965).
29. See, e.g., Terry L. Anderson & Peter J. Hill, Privatizing the Commons: An
Improvement?, 50 S. ECON. J. 438, 441,447 (1983) (arguing that competition for resources can
be inefficient because it encourages excessive expenditure in the attempt to win); Dean Lueck,
The Rule of FirstPossessionand the Design of the Law, 38 J.L. & ECON. 393, 395-409 (1995)
(modeling conditions under which first possession rules can instigate wasteful racing
behavior).
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interaction for law to recognize a different rule for establishing
ownership.3' For example, whaling customs track the certain control
norms of possession except when whales are too dangerous or too
likely to sink to make them practicable. 3 ' The whaling industry and
whaling communities can develop the more specific information at
low cost.32 But the norm of first possession is left in place in a
surprisingly wide variety of contexts. This widespread and general
norm allows nonexpert and anonymous parties to interact in
predictable and peaceful ways.
2. NonreciprocalCausation
Coase made famous the idea that in any conflict over resources,
causation is reciprocal.3" If a rancher's cattle are trampling the
farmer's corn, 34 or the confectioner's pestle is making too much noise
for the neighboring doctor,3" or a factory is sending foul odors onto
the land of a resident, 6 Coase pointed out that each activity is
30. Smith, supranote 8, at 1115-25.
31. See Robert C. Ellickson, A Hypothesis of Wealth-Maximizing Norms: Evidence from
the Whaling Industry, 5 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 83, 88-94 (1989); Smith, supranote 8, at 1119-22;
see also Swift v. Gifford, 23 F. Cas. 558, 559-60 (D. Mass. 1872) (No. 13,696) ("The rule of law
invoked in this case is one of very limited application. The whale fishery is the only branch
of industry of any importance in which it is likely to be much used; and if a usage is found to
prevail generally in that business, it will not be open to the objection that it is likely to disturb
the general understanding of mankind by the interposition of an arbitrary exception.").
32. Smith, supra note 8, at 1121-22.
33. R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 2, 8-15, 35 (1960).
34. Id. at 2-8.
35. Id. at 8. See also Sturges v. Bridgman, (1879) 11 Ch.D. 852, 852-53, the case upon
which Coase based his example.
36. Coase, supra note 33, at 1. Coase discussed, among other cases, Bass v. Gregory,
(1890) 25 Q.B.D. 481, 481-82, involving the owners of a public house with a brewing vat and
an owner of some cottages with a well that served as a ventilating shaft for the vat. The
factory-resident scenario featured prominently in Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed,
Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability:One View of the Cathedral,85 HARV. L.
REV. 1089, 1089-90, 1110-12, 1115-24 (1972), and has continued to be a stock example in the
literature on property rules and liability rules. See, e.g., Richard R.W. Brooks, The Relative
Burden of DeterminingPropertyRules and LiabilityRules: Broken Elevators in the Cathedral,
97 Nw. U. L. REv. 267, 292 (2002) (discussing "the familiar example of a dispute between a
polluter and a resident who is affected by the pollution"); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell,
PropertyRules Versus LiabilityRules: An Economic Analysis, 109 HARV. L. REV. 713, 748-52
(1996) (arguing for employment of pollution taxes rather than a liability system); James E.
Krier & Stewart J. Schwab, Essay, PropertyRules and Liability Rules: The Cathedral in
Another Light, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 440, 441-43 (1995) (using pollution example in arguing for
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necessary for a conflict to exist. If either were eliminated, there
would be no harmful interaction and, therefore, in Coase's view, it
makes no sense to speak of either activity as being the cause of the
problem.3" Such a view fits in well with the bundle of sticks
conception of property: a judge faced with conflicting uses can decide
which is the more valuable and favor it with the entitlement to the
use. Promoting the more valuable use could take the form of making
the one engaged in the less worthy use liable or, in the case of more
sensitive uses, simply denying relief from the "harm" from the more
valuable use.
This stick-by-stick view of resolving resource conflicts does not
accord with core property law.3 8 Instead, the starting point in
property is to ask whose default package of entitlements-starting
with the basic right to exclude-would cover the conflict in question.
If what A is doing causes something tangible to cross the boundary
line onto B's land, the presumption is that there is a violation. In
the case of visible objects, the law of trespass makes this the end of
the story. Nuisance law is often seen as adopting a system of ad hoc
balancing to decide which of two interfering uses will prevail, but
the balancing type of analysis is less widespread than one might
think.3" And even in cases that ostensibly balance, causation is not
really regarded as reciprocal.4"
It is worthwhile to note that reciprocal causation does not accord
with everyday intuitions about morality. If A punches B in the nose,
we do not see B's nose as having contributed causally to the fistnose interaction. More generally, some of the most serious moral

new type of liability rule). See generally Ian Ayres & Paul M. Goldbart, Optimal Delegation
and Decoupling in the Design of Liability Rules, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1 (2001) (discussing a
nuisance dispute between polluter and resident); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, PropertyRights and
Liability Rules: The Ex Ante Vew of the Cathedral,100 MICH. L. REV. 601 (2001) (involving
a factory and resort).
37. Coase, supra note 33, at 2.
38. See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Essay, What Happenedto Propertyin Law
and Economics?, 111 YALE L.J. 357, 391-94 (2001) (discusssing the skepticism with which
legal scholars have received the idea of "causal agnosticism"). For a discussion of how
nuisance law does not reflect Coasean causal agnosticism, see Henry E. Smith, Exclusion and
PropertyRules in the Law of Nuisance, 90 VA. L. REV. 965 (2004).
39. Smith, supra note 38, at 974.
40. See MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 68-69 (1987).
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objections to Coasean analysis have come from those who find the
implications for killing and rape to be unacceptable.4 1
Property rights are in a sense "lumpy" and their lumpiness
breaks the symmetry between the holder of the right and neighbors
or strangers.4 2 Partly because our moral intuitions track thingness,
we do not evaluate conflicts on a stick-by-stick basis. Instead, the
right to exclude indirectly protects a wide range of uses.43 The right
to exclude directs us to very simple signals of boundary crossing, in
a nonreciprocal fashion. Property rights are ex ante and lumpy, and
when the interaction comes along, the causal question is no longer
up for grabs as it is in Coase's hypothetical world.4 4
Property rights reflect nonreciprocal causation and draw on
morality in doing so. Nowhere is this more dramatically the case
than in the discussions over Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas
Melamed's framework of property rules and liability rules.4 5 A
property rule gives the current holder of the entitlement a veto over
transfers; the property rule is designed to be robust enough to force
potential takers into respecting the entitlement or acquiring it
consensually.4" A liability rule allows the nonholder to take the
entitlement from its current holder by paying officially determined
damages; the current holder has no absolute veto.4 7 Reflecting
Coase's views on reciprocal causation, Calabresi and Melamed noted
that one could locate the entitlement in either party and protect it
by either a property rule or a liability rule." In the canonical
41. See, e.g., id. at 68-69, 118-19 (criticizing transaction cost analysis of questions of
entitlement not to be raped and noting the role of reciprocal view of causation); A.W. Brian
Simpson, Coase v. Pigou Reexamined, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 53, 60 (1996) ("[O]nce the reciprocal
nature of the problem is conceded, there is just no end to the possibilities .... The reciprocal
nature of human interaction can raise emotive issues, as when women object to the idea that
the way to stop sexual assaults on the streets at night is for them to stay at home. Even if
they are the cheapest cost avoiders, ought this to be conclusive?").
42. See Smith, supra note 12, at 70-76.
43. A number of authors have stressed this aspect as a result of philosophical analysis of
the concept of property. See, e.g., J.W. HARRIS, PROPERTYAND JUSTICE 30-32 (1996) (analyzing
property as an "open ended" set of "use-privileges" protected by "trespassory rules"); PENNER,
supra note 7, at 68-74 (noting the connection between use and exclusion).
44. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
45. See generally Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 36.
46. Id. at 1092.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 1092-93.
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example of the polluter and the resident, the resident could have the
entitlement-the right to be free from pollution-with property rule
protection (Rule 1)." If the polluter would like to continue polluting,
it must pay the price demanded by the resident. Or, the resident
could have the entitlement protected only by a liability rule (Rule
2).5" The polluter could, if it so chose, pollute and pay compensatory
damages for the harm inflicted on the resident. Calabresi and
Melamed note that the shoe could be on the other foot; the polluter
could have the entitlement.5 ' Here, Coasean reciprocal causation
gets us into trouble. Yes, the polluter could have the entitlement
protected by a property rule (Rule 3). But what does that mean?
Having "the entitlement" could mean that the polluter could have
a separately negotiated easement for pollution, and, in this
sense-mostly relevant only to the parties to the agreement-there
would be a right to pollute.5 2
But what if no such adjustment has occurred to the default
package of rights held by the polluter and the resident? Seemingly,
when commentators speak of a "right to pollute," what they really
mean is that a court will deny either an injunction or damages to
the resident. 3 But the question is whether this is equivalent to a
49. Id. at 1115-16.
50. Id. at 1116.
51. See id. at 1090.
52. We do not argue that the bundle of rights is not a useful analytical tool or that owners
may not, as between themselves and identified others, break up the bundle. But, as soon as
this fragmentation of the bundle presents information costs to third parties, as easements in
rem theoretically do, the fragmentation must follow the fault lines prescribed by property law,
specifically through the numerus claususprinciple. See generally Merrill & Smith, supranote
38. Courts will make an effort to pigeonhole a detached "stick" into the category of license,
easement, or lease. See, e.g., Baseball Publ'g Co. v. Bruton, 18 N.E.2d 362, 364 (Mass. 1938)
(finding that plaintiffs right to hang a sign on defendant's wall is an easement).
53. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 36, at 1118-19 (discussing"the right to pollute");
see also Ayres & Goldbart, supra note 36, at 46 (discussing "the right to pollute" in the
property rule versus liability rule framework); Kaplow & Shavell, supranote 36, at 719 n.14
(noting the alternative of protecting a polluter's right to pollute with a property rule); Edward
Rabin, Nuisance Law: Rethinking Fundamental Assumptions, 63 VA. L. REV. 1299, 1343
(1977) (arguing that it is an oversimplification to speak of a "right to pollute" because the
polluter "actually has only a qualified right to pollute in quantities reasonable for the time
and place, given the present state of the art of pollution abatement"). For a very careful
formulation of how the failure of a plaintiff's suit against a polluter results, "[iln effect," that
the defendant "enjoins" the plaintiff and enjoys "what amounts to a property right," see
KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE FoRMS AND FUNCTIONS OF TORT LAW 176-77 (2d ed. 2002).
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"right to pollute." Before considering this possibility, note that the
notion of a right to pollute offends the moral sense of many commentators.5 4 The legislative history behind the Clean Water Act of 1972,
to take but one example, assumes as a baseline that "[n]o one has
the right to pollute."5 5 Interestingly, it offends the right-to-exclude
foundation of the default package of property rights as well. When
a court denies a resident either an injunction or damages in a
nuisance case-which should be exceptional based on the traditional
view of property-the polluter is exercising a privilege, not a right,
to pollute.56 The resident cannot come onto the polluter's land and
smash the factory because that would violate the polluter's right to
exclude. But nothing stops the resident from exercising her own
privileges and, for example, building a wall or erecting a large fan
to stop the fumes from coming over the boundary line. A court
would not enjoin the wall or the fan. 7 Properly considered, the
Blackstonian default package of rights 5 8 -a right to exclude coupled
with a wide range of largely unspecified privileges to use--breaks
54. See, e.g., Todd B. Adams, Is There a Legal Future for Sustainable Development in
Global Warming? Justice, Economics, and Protectingthe Environment, 16 GEO. INT'L ENVTL.
L. REv. 77, 122 (2003) (noting that critics regard cap-and-trade programs as immoral because
such programs acknowledge "a property right to pollute"); Peter Berck & Gloria E. Helfand,
The Case of Markets Versus Standardsfor PollutionPolicy, 45 NAT. RESOURCES J. 345, 365-66
(2005) ("[E]nvironmental goods are not and should not be simple market goods."); Michael J.
Sandel, It's Immoral To Buy the Right To Pollute, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 1997, at A23
("[T]urning pollution into a commodity to be bought and sold removes the moral stigma that
is properly associated with it.").
55. S. REP. NO. 92-414, at 43 (1972), as reprintedin 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668,3709; 1 STAFF
OF S. COMM. ON PUB. WORKS, 93D CONG., A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE WATER POLLUTION
CONTROL ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1972, at 1415, 1461 (Comm. Print 1973).
56. See Smith, supra note 38, at 1037-45.
57. The treatise upon which Coase relied states unequivocally that
the right to a lateral passage of air, as well as to a flow of water, superadds a
privilege to the ordinary rights of property, and is quite distinct from that right
which every owner of a tenement, whether ancient or modern, possesses to
prevent his neighbour transmitting to him air or water in impure condition; this
latter right is one of the ordinary incidents of property, requiring no easement
to support it, and can be countervailed only by the acquisition of an easement
for that purpose by the party causing the nuisance.
GALE ON EASEMENTS 241 (Michael Bowles ed., 13th ed. 1959).
58. The basic exclusionary regime is similar to what Robert Ellickson calls the
"Blackstonian' Bundle of Land Entitlements." Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102
YALE L.J. 1315, 1362-63 (1993). This lumpy "bundle" is unique and has the status of a default,
partly for information cost reasons. See Smith, supra note 21, at 454.
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the symmetry between the polluter's and resident's entitlement
possibilities.
It should come as no surprise, then, that Calabresi and
Melamed's Rule 4, under which the polluter has the "entitlement to
pollute" that the resident can take upon payment of the polluter's
cost of abatement or shutting down,59 makes little sense and has
only rarely been encountered in actual practice. In the case of the
resident's entitlement, substitution of damages for injunctions (Rule
2 for Rule 1) is a way of softening the default bundle in the face of
holdouts, granting for the sake of argument that this is a good idea.
In the case of the possibility of the polluter entitlement, however,
nothing in the Blackstonian bundle gives the polluter a robust right
(as opposed to a mere privilege) to pollute. There is, therefore, no
need to "soften" it with Rule 4.' That symmetry has been broken by
setting up lumpy Blackstonian rights to exclude in the first place.
This gives additional content to objections to Rule 4, suggesting that
it ignores the preexisting baselines of property.6 1
Again, the notion of a right to pollute illustrates our view of the
relation between property and morality. A right to pollute sounds
morally offensive, in part because our default entitlements track
moral rules under which causation is not reciprocal.6 2 Problems like
pollution are, in the normal course, not treated as free-floating use
conflicts, but as a matter of moral rights. Part of the difficulty in
negotiating easements is overcoming the stickiness of this moral
right, much to the annoyance of the social engineer.' Likewise, on
59. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 36, at 1116.
60. See Smith, supra note 38, at 1020-21.
61. Cf. Richard A. Epstein, A Clear View of The Cathedral-The Dominance of Property
Rules, 106 YALE L.J. 2091, 2103-05 (1997) (referring to Rule 4 as posing an "enormous risk,"
"grotesque," "wholly subversive of any account of ordinary property rights," and "misguided");
Pierre Schlag, An Appreciative Comment on Coase's The Problem of Social Cost: A View from
the Left, 1986 Wis. L. REV. 919, 950 (noting approvingly that "Coase's insight ... destabilizes
the received wisdom of the common law and its conventional moral and aesthetic
architecture").
62. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151, 151-53
(1973); see also RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS 115-21 (1985); Donald H. Gjerdingen, The Coase
Theorem and the Psychology of Common-Law Thought, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 711, 724-25 (1983);
Kenneth R. Vogel, The Coase Theorem and CaliforniaAnimal Trespass Law, 16 J. LEGAL
STUD. 149, 152-54 (1987).
63. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Moral Heuristicsand Moral Framing,88 MINN. L. REV.
1556, 1580-81 (2004) (accusing Michael Sandel of erroneous extension of"a moral heuristic"
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a larger scale, tradable emissions permits have been designed so
that they do not look like rights to pollute.' The robustness of the
moral intuition against a right to pollute is a firm starting point, as
is the right to exclude that implements these intuitions automatically.
B. Some Implications
If property is critically dependent on simple moral intuitions
about the importance of protecting possession against unwanted
invasions, then this has critical implications for the way the
institution is understood. First, it suggests that the type of morality
needed to sustain a system of property rights must be something
other than unconstrained pragmatism. Much effort has gone into
explaining, justifying, and critiquing property from a consequentialist point of view. Much of this theorizing has implicitly assumed
that property is fully malleable.6 5 Based on this expert-oriented
view," one might think that the more property can be justified in
utilitarian terms, the more utilitarianism would succeed at putting
property on its own foundation without regard to extralegal moral
considerations, such as the intuition that it is wrong to steal. The
wrongness of theft can be seen as part and parcel of a thing-based
right-to-exclude view of property, which is too naive to stand in
the light of sophisticated analysis.6 7 But success in justifying an
in arguing that emissions trading is immoral).
64. See Thomas W. Merrill, ExplainingMarket Mechanisms,2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 275, 284
(noting that trading systems are often based on prior pollution control standards adopted
without regard to efficiency norms); see also Henry A. Span, Note, Of TEAs and Takings:
Compensation Guaranteesfor Confiscated Tradeable EnvironmentalAllowances, 109 YALE
L.J. 1983 (2000) (discussing the Fifth Amendment implications of tradable emissions
allowances).
65. For a general discussion of this assumption, see Merrill & Smith, supra note 38.
Scholars, particularly economists, conceive of property as "an ad hoc collection of rights in
resources." Id. at 358.
66. Bruce Ackerman terms this the perspective of the "[s/cientific [p]olicymaker." BRUCE
A. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 10-20 (1977) (contrasting ordinary
observer's and scientific policymaker's view of property).
67. See, e.g., Edward L. Rubin, Due Processand the Administrative State, 72 CAL. L. REV.
1044, 1086 (1984) ("[Pjroperty is simply a label for whatever 'bundle of sticks' the individual
has been granted."); Joan Williams, The Rhetoric of Property,83 IOWA L. REV. 277,297 (1998)
("Labeling something as property does not predetermine what rights an owner does or does
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institution on utilitarian grounds does not foreclose a role for
deontology in the institution. This can be seen in the case of those
rights that have even stronger prelegal moral intuitions backing
them-civil and human rights. Rights not to be killed or subject to
violence clearly serve an important function in society and are
obviously welfare-increasing. But this is not to say that this is all
there is to such rights, that people generally think about them in
these terms, or that they make decisions involving them using
utilitarian calculus.
Although both property rights and civil or human rights can be
justified on utilitarian grounds, that does not mean that they can be
cashed out into mere utilitarian precepts or rules of thumb and
nothing more. Moral philosophers and legal activists who champion
human or civil rights, such as rules against torture or rape, would
agree that such rights have utilitarian justifications. But most
would not, out of this consideration, acquiesce in the notion that
these rights are just utilitarian rules of thumb, subject to case-bycase adjustment in accordance with pragmatic considerations."
The same general point holds true for property rights: just
because property serves utilitarian ends does not mean that the
definition and enforcement of property rights reduces to case-bycase pragmatics.
Second, our account suggests that the Legal Realists' favorite
metaphor of property as a bundle of rights is seriously misleading
as a general account of property. The metaphor implies a degree of
malleability that is not, and arguably cannot be, displayed in the
core of property rights.6 9
The Realist view-which has been carried forward in much of
modern law-and-economics and property scholarship-requires that
the traditional everyday morality of property, grounded in the right
to exclude, be denigrated and dismissed. Tom Grey, in his classic
formulation of the bundle of rights picture, notes that
[t]he legal realists who developed the bundle-of-rights notion
were on the whole supporters of the regulatory and welfare
not have in it.").
68. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
69. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
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state, and in the writings that develop the bundle-of-rights

conception, a purpose to remove the sanctity that had traditionally attached to the rights of property can often be discerned.7"
One prime example is Felix Cohen. He saw the right to exclude as
important to defining property." But he also regarded property
rights as emanating from the state, and considered traditional
common law rules implementing the right to exclude as unworthy
of any presumptive force, especially to the extent they rely on
everyday notions of "things" and traditional morality." Drawing on
then-contemporary pragmatist and logical-positivist currents in
philosophy, he dismissed these conventional views as metaphysical,
meaningless, and superstitious.7 3 His essay, 'Transcendental
Nonsense and the Functional Approach," the title of which echoes
Bentham's critique of natural rights as "nonsense upon stilts,"74
provides a clear indication of Cohen's felt need to denigrate
traditional morality in order to clear the way for a more rational
design of the legal system, property rights included. Indeed, the
article is stuffed with dismissive references to metaphysical
status and the supernatural, 5 "scholastic theologians,"7 6 medieval
popes,7 7 angels on needles," myths,7 9 "true believers in the orthodox
legal theology, 8 "moral faiths or prejudices,"'" and "otherworldy"
morality. 2 Likewise, Edward Robinson pairs advocacy of "scientific"
70. Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegrationof Property,in NOMOS XXII: PROPERTY 69, 81 (J.
Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1980).
71. Felix S. Cohen, Dialogue on Private Property,9 RUTGERS L. REv. 357, 373-74 (1954).
72. See Felix S. Cohen, TranscendentalNonsense and the FunctionalApproach,35 COLUM.
L. REV. 809, 815-17 (1935).
73. See id.
74. See, e.g., JEREMY BENTHAM, Anarchical Fallacies: Being an Examination of the
Declarationsof Rights Issued During the French Revolution, in 2 THE WORKS OF JEREMY
BENTHAM 501 (John Bowring ed., 1843); see also A.I. MELDEN, RIGHTS AND PERSONS 179
(1977).
75. Cohen, supra note 72, at 810-11, 816, 821-22, 826, 828, 831.
76. Id. at 810.
77. Id. at 813.
78. Id. at 810.
79. Id. at 812.
80. Id. at 818; see id. at 821, 831.
81. Id. at 816; see id. at 841.
82. Id. at 840; see id. at 839-40. Cohen advocates a "functional approach" to religion itself.
See id. at 830-31.
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social engineering 3 with disdain for "old ways of thinking'8 4 and
(nonrealist) "experts [who] are continually mistaking the vividness
of their moral indignation for the probable efficiency of their devices
for social control. 8 5
Interestingly, like the antiproperty theorists who offer an
alternative morality under which property is theft, the Realists
too offer a different moral vision. First, in pragmatic or utilitarian
terms, they believe that social engineering can come up with more
satisfactory answers to resource conflicts.8 6 The technocratic
approach is probably clearest where property implicates environmental values; again, Realism aside, environmentalism tends to be
cast in strongly moral but antiproperty terms.8 7 Second, the Realists
claim to be implementing some more general, but largely unspecified, moral command, akin to the Golden Rule.88 The Realists
envision judges and regulators devising detailed rules of proper use
of resources.8 9 They take as antecedents traditional but weaker
versions of the Golden Rule, such as can be found in the maxim sic
utere tuo ut alienum non laedas: "use your property so as not to
damage another's."9 °
The Realists' reliance on an extreme version of the bundle of
rights, under which no baselines are privileged and bundles are
plastic in the hands of courts and legislatures, has become a sort of
conventional baseline itself for property theorists. For example,
Coase presupposed a radically realist bundle of rights picture of
property and this carried forward to modern law and economics. 9
The framework of property rules and liability rules, as we have
seen, rests on a very thin and agnostic notion of entitlement. This
83. Edward S. Robinson, Law--An Unscientific Science, 44 YALE L.J. 235, 236-38, 267
(1934).
84. Id. at 253.
85. Id. at 236.
86. See Max Radin, Legal Realism, 31 COLUM. L. REV. 824, 825 (1931) (defining legal
realism as a method to advance "social utility" or achieve "social change" without any true
standard).
87. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
88. See, e.g., Radin, supra note 86, at 825 (arguing that Realists must "decide between a
better and a worse readjustment of the human relations disturbed by an event").
89. Cf. id. ("[O]ne of the most urgent of legal problems is to find out just when any
particular standard is to be applied.").
90. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1757 (8th ed. 2004).

91. See generally Merrill & Smith, supranote 38.
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has proved true of more recent work in this area, with its divided
entitlements, put options, dual-chooser rules, and higher-level
auctions.9 2 Outside law and economics, the idea that property serves
as any kind of presumption finds little favor. Instead, it is taken as
self-evident that property is a bundle of rights, the content of which
is whatever lawmakers decide it should be.93
What these approaches have in common is their context-dependence. They do not rule out any considerations and regard property
rights as plastic in the hands of the enlightened social engineer.
This is their main appeal to the Realists-and their successors. But
their very context-dependence renders them ineligible as a foundation for a moral theory of property rights, given the in rem quality
of those rights and the coordination problem this feature entails. 4
II. MORALITY AND AMERICAN PROPERTY LAW
Property law often generates outcomes that are strongly conditioned by moral values. This Part discusses doctrines or decisions
that reveal the moral side of property law. The features we identify
with morality-based decision making include (1) sharp condemnations of certain kinds of violations of property rights; (2) the
implausibility of explaining these condemnatory responses in terms
of case-specific utilitarian balancing or cost-benefit analysis; (3)
explanations for the protection of property couched in deontological
or rights-language, rather than consequentialist justifications; and
(4) a scope of protection for property rights that goes beyond what
would be needed to protect nonproperty-based interests, such as
bodily security or privacy, suggesting that the protection of property
is viewed as a moral good in itself. Each of the following doctrines
exhibits some of the foregoing features, although usually not all at
once. Collectively, they suggest that property, at least in its core
significations, is infused with moral value.
92. For one recent and highly developed example in which new, complicated designed
mechanisms are offered as a proposal to structure entitlements, see IAN AYRES, OPTIONAL
LAW: THE STRUCTURE OF LEGAL ENTITLEMENTS 3-6 (2005).
93. See supra notes 65-67. For a recent example of two authors making the assumption
that property is purely a creature of law-in this case, the tax system-and has no other force,
presumptive or otherwise, see LIAM MURPHY & THOMAS NAGEL, THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP:
TAXES AND JUSTICE 8-9 (2002).
94. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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A. Trespass to Land
The tort of trespass to land illustrates all four of the features that
characterize the moral dimension of property law. The tort of
intentional trespass to land has been described as "exceptionally
simple and exceptionally rigorous."9 5 An intentional trespass occurs
when the defendant knowingly or deliberately crosses the boundary
lines of another's land, either personally or with an object large
enough to displace the owner of possession." No inquiry is made
into the comparative utility of the invasion as between the intruder
and the possessor.9 7 Especially interesting for our purposes, the tort
occurs irrespective of whether the defendant causes any harm to the
possessor.9" Accordingly, the midnight streaker who dashes unseen
across the lawn of another, and who merely bends a few blades of
grass in the process, is guilty of the tort of trespass. Moreover,
courts have traditionally granted automatic injunctive relief against
continuing or episodic trespasses, without regard to any balancing
of the equities.9 9
A recent decision of the Wisconsin Supreme Court, Jacque v.
SteenbergHomes, Inc.,' illustrates all these features of the doctrine
and highlights the moral nature of judicial decision making in
enforcing property rights. The case involved a dispute between an
elderly Wisconsin couple, Harvey and Lois Jacque, who lived on 170
acres of rural land near Schleswig, Wisconsin; and a mobile home
sales company, Steenberg Homes, which wanted to deliver a mobile
home to a neighbor of the Jacques.' 01 The private road to the
neighbor's land had a sharp curve and was covered with seven feet
of snow, so Steenberg Homes sought permission from the Jacques
to cut a path across their field.'0 2 The Jacques refused permission,
even when the company offered to pay for temporary access
95. WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 63 (4th ed. 1971) (citing 1

STREET, FOUNDATION OF LEGAL LIABILITY 19 (1906)).
96. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 158 (1965).

97. See id.; id. § 158 cmt. c.
98. Id. § 158 cmt. c.
99. See, e.g., Nishanian v. Sirohi, 414 S.E.2d 604 (Va. 1992) (granting injunctive relief for
continuing trespass).
100. 563 N.W.2d 154 (Wis. 1997).
101. Id. at 156.
102. Id. at 157.
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rights.10 3 Evidently, the couple harbored irrational fears that giving
such permission might result in an adverse possession claim against
their land. 10 4 Rather than take "no" for an answer, the company cut
across their field anyway, in a manner designed to conceal what
they were doing. 10 5
Faced with these facts, the Wisconsin Supreme Court not only
upheld a jury verdict of $1 in nominal damages for the trespass, but
it reinstated an award of $100,000 in punitive damages against the
company.'0 6 The opinion's tone was one of quiet outrage. The
Jacques were portrayed as a helpless old couple, whose right to do
as they pleased with their land would be rendered meaningless
without vigorous judicial intervention. The assistant manager of the
mobile home company was portrayed as a scofflaw who was
contemptuous of the rights of others.0 7 The court's willingness to
impose a large punitive damages award-one hundred times the
largest criminal fine that could be imposed for this behavior0 8
-spoke for itself.
The court made no attempt to consider whether the trespass
would have been cost-justified.0 9 Clearly using the Jacques' field as
a temporary delivery path would have been the most efficient
outcome. The opportunity costs of the intrusion to the Jacques were
apparently zero: they had retired from active farming,"0 and using
the land as a temporary delivery path foreclosed no alternative use
of it; nor did the Jacques suffer any risk of losing the land by
granting permission. The company, in contrast, faced considerable
risk, and not a little time and effort, if it had to use rollers to wrestle
the ungainly mobile home around a curved private road covered in
seven feet of snow. Reasonable persons would have quickly agreed
on a temporary license as a solution to the problem; the Jacques
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 156.
107. Id. at 160, 164. The Steenberg employees testified that the assistant manager had told
them: "I don't give a -.-- what [Mr. Jacque] said, just get the home in there any way you can"
and had laughed when he heard of the violation of the Jacques' property rights, all of which
the assistant manager denied. Id. at 157 (alteration in original).
108. Id. at 165; see WIS. STAT. §§ 943.13(lm)(b), 939.51(3)(b) (2006).
109. See Jacque, 563 N.W.2d at 158.
110. Id. at 156.
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were not reasonable persons. But the court obviously believed that
did not matter; the question of comparative utilities simply was
irrelevant to the analysis.
When justifying the punitive award, the court spoke in
deontological terms. The award was designed to ensure that
companies like Steenberg would respect property rights. A small
criminal fine or nominal award of actual damages could not have
achieved this result."' As the court asked, "[W]hat is to stop
Steenberg Homes from concluding, in the future, that delivering its
mobile homes via an intentional trespass and paying the resulting
Class B forfeiture, is not more profitable than obeying the law?""' 2
This is not the rhetoric of efficient breach or of cost-internalization
via liability rules. In the court's view, Steenberg Homes had an
unqualified duty to respect the Jacques' property rights, without
regard to whether their3 reasons for refusing permission were
unfounded or even silly."
Finally, the court did not regard the justification for punitive
damages to be reducible to nonproperty values. At one point, the
court justified the award on the grounds that it would discourage
persons from using self-help to protect their property, which in turn
could lead to violence." 4 And the court also laid considerable stress
on an English case, Merest v. Harvey, which seemed to justify
punitive damages for trespasses in terms of the protection of privacy
rights."' There was no evidence in the opinion, however, suggesting
that the trespass in question threatened either of these values.
Moreover, the court consistently described the right in question
much more broadly; it was "the individual's legal right to exclude
others from private property"-the right of Harvey and Lois Jacque
"to tell Steenberg Homes and any other trespasser, 'No, you cannot
cross our land.""' 6 Punitive damages were awarded to vindicate this
broader right-a pure property right-not to promote public utility
by preventing violence or protecting privacy.

111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

See id. at 165.
Id. at 161.
See id. at 164.
Id. at 160-61.
See id. at 159.
Id. at 160.
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In short, Jacque-and the doctrine of intentional trespass it
enforced-bears all the features this Part has ascribed to moral
decision making in property law. Unlicensed invasions of land often
trigger sharp condemnations from courts; the core prohibition
applies even when the balance of benefits and costs would seem to
favor the invasion; the rationale for the rule is often expressed in
deontological terms; and the rule applies without regard to whether
the invasion threatens underlying values protected by the doctrine,
such as preventing violence to persons or protecting privacy rights.
B. Adverse Possession
The influence of moral values appears in many other places in
property law, often without being expressly acknowledged. One
prominent example occurs in the law of adverse possession. To gain
title to property by adverse possession, the possession must be
"adverse" to the true owner." 7 This means, according to most courts,
that the possession must be without the true owner's permission." 8
There is confusion in the case law about the relevance of the
possessor's subjective knowledge about the rights of the true owner.
Most jurisdictions do not expressly require good faith-that is, that
the possessor have no subjective knowledge of the true owner's

117. 16 RICHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 91.05[4] (Michael Allan Wolfed.,
2000).
118. See, e.g., Shandaken Reformed Church of Mount Tremper v. Leone, 451 N.Y.S.2d 227,
228 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982) ("When possession is permissive in its inception, adverse possession
will not arise until there is a distinct assertion of a right hostile to the owner and brought
home to him."); ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 11.7, at 760 (1984).
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title-but a minority do." 9 And there are even suggestions from
time to time that bad faith is required. 20
Professor Richard Helmholz, nevertheless, argues that good faith
is important to courts in deciding adverse possession cases.' 2 ' After
surveying a large number of adverse possession decisions, Helmholz
concludes that courts are reluctant to award title by adverse
possession to persons who act with actual knowledge of the superior
claim of another.'2 2 As the system of adverse possession operates in
practice, then, good faith is akin to an unstated requirement of
success.
Limiting transfer of title by adverse possession to cases of good
faith makes little sense from a utilitarian point of view. 2 ' Such a
requirement means that the statute of limitations will never run on
many acts of adverse possession, complicating the titles of many
types of durable property, such as land and artwork. Such a
requirement also frustrates the expectations of many persons who
119. See POWELL, supranote 117, § 91.05[2]-[3]. Oregon passed a statute making good faith
a requirement for adverse possession:
(1) A person may acquire fee simple title to real property by adverse possession
only if...
(b) At the time the person claiming by adverse possession or the person's
predecessors in interest, first entered into possession of the property, the
person entering into possession had the honest belief that the person was
the actual owner of the property and that belief:
(A) By the person and the person's predecessor in interest, continued
throughout the vesting period;

(B) Had an objective basis; and
(C) Was reasonable under the particular circumstances ....
Act of August 5, 1989, ch. 1069 § 1(1), 1989 Or. Laws 2170 (codified as amended at OR. REV.
STAT. § 105.620(1) (1991)); see Per C. Olson, Adverse Possession in Oregon: The Belief-inOwnership Requirement, 23 ENvTL. L. 1297 (1993).
120. See Van Valkenburgh v. Lutz, 106 N.E.2d 28,30 (N.Y. 1952); R.H. Helmholz, Adverse
Possession and Subjective Intent, 61 WASH. U. L.Q. 331, 339-41 (1983); see also Lee Anne
Fennell, Efficient Trespass: The Case for 'BadFaith'AdversePossession, 100 NW. U. L. REV.
1037, 1038 (2006) (arguing in favor of the rule). The "Maine Doctrine," requiring bad faith for
adverse possession and so called because of the opinion in the case of Preble v. Maine Central
Railroad,27 A. 149 (Me. 1893), has always been the minority rule. See Helmholz, supra,at
339 & n.32. Indeed, this doctrine is no longer followed in Maine. See 14 ME. REV. STAT. § 810-A
(2006).
121. See Helmholz, supra note 120, at 339-41.
122. See id. at 347.
123. For a general discussion of the utilitarian foundations of adverse possession, see
Thomas W. Merrill, PropertyRules, LiabilityRules, and Adverse Possession,79 Nw. U. L. REV.
1122 (1985).
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have been in possession of land or other property for long periods of
time. Finally, it undermines the incentives of owners to engage in
good custodial practices, because there is less risk of losing their
property to squatters or thieves. Courts, nevertheless, seem highly
reluctant to strip owners of property in favor of someone who has
acted in subjective bad faith in taking it from them.
24
The impulse is essentially the same as that underlying Jacque.1
Someone who has deliberately taken the property of another is
simply a bad person, and should not be rewarded for such behavior.
The immorality of the original act of deprivation trumps all
considerations of utility that can be arrayed on the other side.
Popular morality seems to concur. When proposals are made to
125
restore artwork or other assets to the victims of Nazi persecution,
or to restore land taken from Native American tribes in violation of
treaty rights,12 6 few voices are raised questioning the wisdom of
trying to sort out the claims to these assets, which were taken many
decades ago. Wrongful dispossession of property should be vindicated, apparently without regard to the costs or inconvenience of
attempting to do so after a long passage of time.
This instinct is not limited to American courts. The European
Court of Human Rights recently declared the English common law
rule of adverse possession to violate the European Convention on
Human Rights, insofar as it permits the transfer of title to property
to the adverse possessor without notice or compensation to the true
owner.127 Significantly, the possessor in that case was acting in bad
faith: from the time of original possession, he had full knowledge of
the superior claim and identity of the true owner.128 Although this
feature of the case was not highlighted by the court as an element
of its reasoning, we doubt that adverse possession would be held to
124. See supra notes 100-16 and accompanying text.
125. See Michael J. Bazyler & Amber L. Fitzgerald, Trading With the Enemy: Holocaust
Restitution, the United States Government, and American Industry, 28 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 683,
709-12 (2003).
126. See generally Laurence Armand French, Native American Reparations, in WHEN
SORRY ISN'T ENOUGH: THE CONTROVERSY OVER APOLOGIES AND REPARATIONS FOR HUMAN

INJUSTICE (Roy L. Brooks ed., 1999).
127. J.A. Pye (Oxford) Ltd. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 44302/02 14-16 (2005),
http://www.echr.coe.int/echr (click "Case-Law"; then, the "HUDOC" icon; then, the "Search"
tab; then search for "44302/02" in the "Application Number" field).
128. Id. at 2.
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violate fundamental human rights if it were used to correct an
innocent mistake about title. Of course, only time will tell how the
European Court will develop this new doctrine.
Adverse possession, unlike intentional trespass, is only a partial
illustration of the power of moral precepts in the development of
property law. This is most likely because the moral perspective and
the utilitarian perspective are in some tension, particularly with
respect to the treatment of the bad faith adverse possessor. Yet if we
look closely, we can find evidence of an accommodation between
these perspectives that gives significant weight to the moral
perspective. One obvious accommodation would be to adopt a twotiered statute of limitations, which would be shorter for good faith
possessors and longer for bad faith possessors.1 29 Several European
countries have explicitly adopted this approach. 3 ° Although no
American jurisdiction to our knowledge has explicitly done so,
Helmholz reports that the longer adverse possession lasts, the more
likely courts are to ignore bad faith. 3 ' Moreover, a substantial
number of American jurisdictions have adopted "marketable title
acts," which eliminate nonrecorded claims after a certain period of
time, usually thirty or forty years, without regard to good faith or
bad faith.3 2 So the American system, in practice, is one in which the
doctrine of adverse possession is largely limited to good faith
adverse possessors for periods of ten to twenty years, and bad faith
possessors get clear titles only if they record their claims before
thirty to forty years elapse. If this is even roughly accurate as a
description, the law in practice operates in much the way we would
expect of a doctrine driven significantly by moral concerns.
129. See Richard A. Epstein, Past and Future: The Temporal Dimension in the Law of
Property,64 WASH. U. L.Q. 667, 685-89 (1986).
130. On French law of "prescription" (like adverse possession), see C. cirV. art. 2262
(providing for a thirty-year statute of limitations for prescription of real and personal
property); C. ciV. art. 2265 (reducing this period to ten years for one who is in good faith and
has color of title, if the true owner lives in the jurisdiction in which the real property is
situated, or to twenty years if such owner lives outside the jurisdiction). On Italian law for
"usucaptione" (like adverse possession) of personal property, see C.c. art. 1161 (providing for
ten years for good faith usucaptione of movable propery, twenty years for bad faith); for real
property, see C.c. art. 1158 (providing for twenty years for bad faith); C.c. art. 1159 (providing
for ten years for good faith).
131. Helmholz, supra note 120, at 347-48.
132. HERBERT HOVENKAMP & SHELDON F. KURTZ, THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 14.7, at 523-24
(5th ed. 2001).
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C. Other Bad FaithActors
Helmholz's discovery about the significance of good faith and bad
faith in adverse possession cases can be generalized to many other
areas of property law. Persons who act in bad faith-that is, with
knowledge of the superior title of another-are often deprived of the
benefit of doctrines that give more favorable treatment to those who
act in good faith. Consider some examples.
1. Good Faith Purchasers
The good faith purchaser for value doctrine allows persons in
certain circumstances to take title to property even though their
transferee had no such title to give. For example, if A sells to B, and
B sells to C, and then B's check to A bounces because B had
insufficient funds in the bank, C may nevertheless be allowed to
retain title.133 A has an action against B for damages, of course, but
the object remains with C. As its name implies, the doctrine applies
only to persons like C who purchase in good faith, that is, without
knowledge of the potential defect in B's title. Persons who act in bad
faith, with knowledge of the flaw in the title, are ineligible for this
special dispensation."'
2. Accession
The venerable doctrine of accession provides that ifB takes up an
object that belongs to A, and through labor and skill significantly
transforms the object into something much more valuable than it
was when it was taken up, B will be given title to the object rather
than A.' 35 Of course, A has an action against B for damages, equal
to the value of the object before the improvements were undertaken,
3 The doctrine again applies only to
but the object remains with B."'
133. See, e.g., Kotis v. Nowlin Jewelry, Inc., 844 S.W.2d 920, 922-24 (Tex. App. 1992)
(applying the doctrine and upholding a finding of lack of good faith).
134. See id.
135. See, e.g., Wetherbee v. Green, 22 Mich. 311, 312-14 (1871) (involving the conversion
of trees into hoops); WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 2 COMMENTARIES **404-05; Earl C. Arnold, The
Law of Accession of PersonalProperty,22 COLUM. L. REV. 103, 118 (1922).
136. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 135, at *404.
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persons like B who act in good faith, that is, without knowledge that
the original object belonged to A.
3. Building Encroachments
When someone erects a building that encroaches a few inches
onto the property of a neighbor, courts often refuse to enjoin the
intrusion, in effect transferring a small slice of land from the true
owner to the encroacher. 137 Of course, the true owner has an action
against the encroacher for damages, equal to the value of the land
taken. This doctrine is available only when the encroacher acts in
good faith, that is, without knowledge that the building was
encroaching on the neighbor's land at the time of construction.
Likewise, some states have passed statutes to protect good faith
3
(and only good faith) improvers. 1
In each of the foregoing doctrines, the relevance of good faith
versus bad faith is expressly acknowledged, and the benefits of the
doctrine are reserved for those who act in good faith. These
doctrines therefore conform to the model of morality-based decision
making to a greater extent than does adverse possession law. Here,
we find the decisions expressly condemning the bad faith actor, and
refusing to consider whether case-specific considerations of benefits
and costs might warrant extending the benefits of the doctrine to
those who knowingly deprive others of property rights.
D. Takings for Economic Development
Our next example involves takings by the state. Every sovereign
government enjoys the power of eminent domain-the power to take
property without the consent of the owner in return for payment of
just compensation. 3 9 We have recently witnessed a major contro
137. See, e.g., Golden Press, Inc. v. Rylands, 235 P.2d 592, 594-95 (Colo. 1951) (en banc)
("[M]andatory injunction ... is not to be issued as a matter of course.').
138. See Raab v. Casper, 124 Cal. Rptr. 590, 593-95 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975) (discussing
California good-faith-improver legislation as applied to encroaching cabin on adjacent foothill
lot).
139. Not surprisingly, the right to exclude from things plays a large part in regulatory
takings law. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435-36
(1982); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979) ("[The right to exclude others
[is] one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized
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versy, in the wake of the Supreme Court's decision in Kelo v. City of
New London,140 about whether this power can be used to promote
economic development. Economic development is not precisely
defined, but for present purposes can be understood to refer to a
taking in which property is acquired by eminent domain and then
retransferred to a private commercial entity, in the expectation that
this will lead to more jobs or higher tax revenues for the community
in question. Kelo elicited unprecedented public opposition to the
idea of takings of private property for economic development.141 This
public backlash, when translated into the actions of legislators, local
public officials, and state and lower federal courts, will probably
have a greater impact on the future use of eminent domain than the
Court's decision in Kelo. 142 Certainly for our purposes, we can take
the anti-Kelo position to be a more accurate statement of general
sentiment about property rights than the opposite position.
What accounts for the public hostility to economic development
takings? We think the answer ultimately is the same as that which
explains the antipathy to intentional trespass, larceny, bad-faith
adverse possession, and the other features of property law we have
discussed: economic development takings are regarded as seizures
by the state of the property of innocent persons for reasons that are
distributionally unjust. Both elements-taking from the innocent
and distributional injustice-are necessary to explain the response.
It is instructive to contrast the moral outrage over economic
development takings with the utilitarian analysis of compulsory
rearrangements of ownership rights coupled with compensation. We
as property.").
140. 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005).
141. For an overview, see ROBERT G. DREHER& JOHN D. ECHEVERRIA, KELO'S UNANSWERED
QUESTIONS: THE POLICY DEBATE OVER THE USE OF EMINENT DOMAIN FOR ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT 11, 14 (2006), available at http://www.law.georgetown.edu/gelpi/currentresearch/eminent domain.eminent_pub.cfm.
142. As of November, 2006, thirty-four States have enacted some kind of reform restricting
the exercise of eminent domain in response to the decision in Kelo. This includes ten States
that have adopted reforms by popular referendum. Information about the status of legislative
reforms can be found on the websites of the National Conference of State Legislatures
(www.ncsl.org) and the Castle Coalition (www.castlecoalition.org). Altogether, more than one
hundred bills have been introduced at the state legislative level in the wake of Kelo to restrict
the use of eminent domain for economic development. See Patricia E. Salkin, Swift Legislative
(Over)Reaction to Eminent Domains: Be Careful What You Wish For, 20 PROB. & PROP. 44
(2006).
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can frame the discussion by considering an example cited in Justice
O'Connor's dissenting opinion in Kelo: a taking by eminent domain
for the purpose of replacing a Motel 6 with a Ritz-Carlton. 4 ' From
a utilitarian or economic perspective, the condemnation of a Motel
6 followed by a retransfer to Ritz-Carlton can be easily justified.1 4
The land is worth more in terms of willingness to pay, if improved
by a Ritz-Carlton as opposed to a Motel 6.
Why should society care whether the property is transferred to an
owner who values the site more highly in terms of its willingness to
pay? Because the greater willingness to pay means society as a
whole will be better off: the pie will be larger, which means that
more people can enjoy larger slices. The new wealth generated by
the Ritz-Carlton will be distributed in a variety of ways: more
workers will be employed at the hotel, perhaps at higher wages;
suppliers of inputs to hotels (towels, toiletries, foodstuffs) will have
more to sell, perhaps at higher prices; the shareholders of RitzCarlton hotels may be better off because the firm earns higher
profits; the local government may be better off if it can collect higher
property and sales taxes.
Although not critical, the transfer of the Motel 6 to a Ritz-Carlton
will also possibly generate positive externalities not captured in
priced transactions between the Ritz-Carlton and its workers,
suppliers, shareholders, and tax collectors. Suppose the Motel 6 is
located on a boulevard that is a particularly choice location for
luxury hotels. Various luxury hotels, including Ritz-Carlton, would
like to build on the boulevard, but are reluctant to do so because the
Motel 6 sends the message that this is an area suited to budget
motels. Condemning the Motel 6 and transferring it to Ritz-Carlton
in these circumstances may transform the general ambience of the
area in a way that leads to a boom in luxury hotel construction,

143. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2676 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
144. We omit from the analysis possible cycling problems or systemic instability that might
emerge if any person is allowed to take the property of another upon payment of fair market
value. See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property Rules Versus Liability Rules: An
EconomicAnalysis, 109 HARV. L. REv. 713, 767-68 (1996). These concerns are remote as long
as eminent domain has positive transaction costs that exceed the costs of market transaction
in most circumstances. In any event, these systemic worries have not been cited by the
opponents of economic development takings as a reason for their hostility. See supra notes
140-42 and accompanying text.
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producing a much larger increase in societal wealth than would be
created by the construction of a Ritz-Carlton standing alone.
One objection often interposed at this point is that there is no
need to use eminent domain to acquire the Motel 6 and transfer it
to the Ritz-Carlton, because the economic self-interest of the parties
should lead to a voluntary exchange of rights. By hypothesis, the
change in ownership will produce new wealth; the parties, therefore,
should agree on a voluntary sale at a price whereby the new wealth
is divided between the owners of the Motel 6 and the Ritz-Carlton.
Voluntary exchange, of course, will often occur in these circumstances. But notice that the Motel 6 is in the position of a monopolist with respect to the specific location it currently occupies. If this
location has certain unique attractions as a site for a luxury hotel,
the situation has the features of a bilateral monopoly. The owner of
the Motel 6 may hold out for a disproportionate share of the gains
from the transaction, leading to a bargaining stalemate.'4 5 Should
this happen, the only way to realize the increased wealth would be
to use the power of eminent domain to force a transfer of the site.
Notwithstanding the perfectly plausible utilitarian case for
allowing the Motel 6 to be condemned for a Ritz-Carlton, the public
appears overwhelmingly opposed to such schemes. Commentators
have cited this example repeatedly in the discussions of Kelo, 4 6 and
opponents of the decision clearly regard the taking of a Motel 6 for
retransfer to a Ritz-Carlton to be the kind of taking that should be
impermissible under a well-functioning system of property rights.
The opposition rests on basic moral intuitions, not pragmatic
balancing or cost-benefit analysis.
The basic moral intuition is the same as that which says intentional trespass or theft is wrong. Eminent domain entails the use of
coercion: the state coerces individuals to give up their property in
return for just compensation. Of course, states often coerce individuals. We all have to pay taxes and obey general police regulations.
But the state ordinarily does not coerce individuals to give up their
145. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, The Supreme Court 2004 Term, Foreword: A Political
Court, 119 HARV. L. REv. 31, 93-94 (2005) (complaining that the opinions in Kelo fail to
discuss the holdout problem).
146. See, e.g., Paul Boudreaux, Eminent Domain, Property Rights, and the Solution of
RepresentationReinforcement, 83 DENY. U. L. REV. 1, 14-15 (2005); Alyson Tomme, Note, Tax
Increment Financing:Public Use or PrivateAbuse?, 90 MINN. L. REV. 213, 238 & n.200 (2005).
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discrete property rights unless they have done something wrong,
such as default on a loan or commit a crime. The owner of a Motel
6 has entered into no prior agreement authorizing seizure of her
property, nor has she done anything wrong that would justify the
state taking the property in retribution. We have, in short, what
looks like prima facie immoral conduct-coercion of the innocent.
This helps explain why most Kelo opponents would make an
exception for takings of a Motel 6 if it is blighted.'4 7 Blight is not
well defined in this discourse, but let us assume that it means the
property is a nuisance-it presents a fire hazard or a health hazard
or encourages criminal activity or otherwise threatens to impose
negative externalities on surrounding owners or the community
more generally.14 8 Why might condemning blighted property for
economic development be acceptable, whereas condemning nonblighted property is not? Because the owner of blighted property has
permitted his property to deteriorate below a level of quality
considered minimally acceptable within the relevant community.
The owner of blighted property is morally blameworthy in a way
that the owner of nonblighted property is not, namely because the
owner of blighted property is imposing harm on neighboring
properties.'4 9 The taking of blighted property, therefore, can serve
as an appropriate collective response to harm-causing or immoral
behavior, which is consistent with general intuitions about corrective justice.
The basic immorality of coercing the innocent to give up their
property also helps explain why the payment of compensation to the
owner does not validate the taking in the eyes of the public. Debate
about the limits of eminent domain has long singled out the taking
of property from A and the giving to B as being particularly
objectionable. 50 This objection is readily understandable if A is not
147. See Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2674 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing that takings for
economic development are permissible only when the property entails some "extraordinary,
precondemnation use" that "inflict[s] affirmative harm on society").
148. In short, a blighted property is one that is "the source of any social harm." Id. at 2675
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
149. See id.
150. See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388 (1798) ("[A] law that takes property from
A and gives it to B ...
is against all reason and justice .... "); see also Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. v.
Nebraska, 164 U.S. 403, 417 (1896) (finding an unconstitutional taking when state required
railroad company to give up land so that farmers could build a grain elevator).
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compensated for the taking. In that event, one person is being
singled out for an especially oppressive burden, only to provide an
especially large benefit for another. Opponents of economic development takings, however, also condemn A-to-B transfers, even if A is
assumed to receive full and complete indemnification for the loss.
What remains objectionable about A-to-B transfers, even if fully
compensated, is that the transaction is perceived to confer unduly
concentrated benefits on B. The state's power of coercion is being
used to confer disproportionate benefits on one or a small number
of individuals.
Standing alone, the conferring of disproportionate benefits would
not give rise to much objection. 5 ' But conferring benefits on a select
few is not regarded as a morally acceptable use of the state's power
of coercion."1 2Forcing innocent people to give up their property, even
in return for just compensation, is regarded as morally acceptable
only if the benefits of the transaction will redound to all members
of the community. Economists may come up with fancy arguments
for why transferring the property to Ritz-Carlton will benefit the
whole community, but to the ordinary citizen it looks like pure
favoritism. Some favoritism is to be expected in any form of
government. Coercing innocent persons to give up their homes and
farms in order to bestow favors on the select few, however, crosses
the line of what most persons are prepared to countenance,
consistent with popular perceptions of morality.

151. As commentators have noted, government often acts in ways that result in conferring
disproportionate benefits on the few at the expense of the many. See, e.g., Abraham Bell &
Gideon Parchomovsky, Givings, 111 YALE L.J. 547, 549-51 (2001); Eric Kades, Windfalls, 108
YALE L.J. 1489 (1999). Yet doctrine does not require systematic disgorgement of these
disproportionate benefits. This is another example of nonreciprocity in the law. Takings of
rights (here property) are regarded as problematic in a way that givings are not.
152. When the transferee (B) is a common carrier, like a railroad; or a public utility, like
an electric distribution company, we seem less concerned about the concentration of benefits.
See County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004) (generally disapproving
takings for economic development, but carving out an exception for takings by common
carriers and utilities subject to pervasive regulation). This is because common carrier and
public utility regulations require that the company make its services available to the entire
community on a nondiscriminatory basis thereby assuring that the benefits are widely
distributed. Also, such entities have historically been subject to rate regulation, which limits
the gain they can obtain through the use of coerced property transactions.
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E. Criminalizationof Nonviolent Property Crimes
One telling sign of the relationship between property and
morality is the degree to which interferences with property are
punished as criminal acts. Although functional arguments exist
for criminalizing takings of property," 3 we usually think of criminal
law as condemning acts that are regarded as unambiguously immoral. Thus, when we find, as we do, a broad consensus in support
of criminalizing intentional takings of property, this evidence
strongly supports the proposition that property rights are infused
with moral significance.' 5 4
Also significant is that criminal prohibitions of takings of
property have expanded rather than contracted over time. At one
time, takings of property arguably were criminalized only in
situations that might lead to a breach of the peace. 55 If this were
true, one could say that what the law regards as a matter of moral
concern are violations of personal security, with violations of
property being criminalized only insofar as they are likely to lead to
violations of personal security. Many authors influenced by Legal
Realism, including the drafters of the Model Penal Code, were
drawn to this position.'5 6 Today, this argument is not plausible.
Violations of property rights are criminalized in many contexts with
no likelihood of any breach of the peace accompanying the taking.
To judge by the pattern of the law, the intentional taking of the

153. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 36, at 1124-27 (explaining criminal law as a
mechanism for preventing "property rules" from being unilaterally converted into "liability
rules"); Richard L. Hasen & Richard H. McAdams, The Surprisingly Complex Case Against
Theft, 17 IN'L REV. L. & ECON. 367, 375-77 (1997) (explaining criminal law of theft in terms
of indirect costs and transaction costs); Alvin K. Klevorick, On the Economic Theory of Crime,
in CRIMINAL JUSTICE: NOMOS XXVII 289, 301-04 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman
eds., 1985) (explaining the function of criminal law in maintaining the "transaction structure"
of legal entitlements including property rights).
154. On the close relationship between criminal law and everyday conceptions of morality,
see Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Role of Deterrence in the Formulation of
Criminal Law Rules: At Its Worst When Doing Its Best, 91 GEO. L.J. 949 (2003); Paul H.
Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 Nw. U.L. REV. 453 (1997). Robinson and
Darley argue that the criminal law functions best when it reflects and reinforces common
conceptions of morality, and functions worst when it tries to create incentives for persons that
conflict with those conceptions.
155. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 19.1(a) (4th ed. 2003).
156. See infra note 158 and accompanying text.
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property of another is regarded as a moral wrong sufficiently grave
in itself to warrant criminalization.
The history of the crime of larceny reveals this pattern very
clearly. Larceny at common law was defined as a taking of property
from the possession of another with intent to convert it to one's own
use. 5 v Given the heavy emphasis on the taking from possession, the
common law courts can plausibly be said to have viewed larceny as
defending society against breach of the peace, rather than protecting
individual property rights per se. 15 8 For example, a bailee who
rightfully obtained possession of property from its owner could not
be guilty of larceny.'5 9 The result was that the crime of larceny was
quite narrow in scope.
Gradually, the courts began to expand the reach of the offense,
initially by subtle alterations in the common law concept of
possession. 6 0 Thus, for instance, a general rule emerged that goods
entrusted to an employee were not deemed to be in his possession,
but were only considered to be in his custody, so long as he remained on the employer's premises.'' Similarly, the case of Chisser
held that a shop owner retained legal possession of merchandise
being examined by a prospective customer until the actual sale was
made.'6 2 By holding that the customer had not acquired possession,
but merely "custody," the court was able to sustain a larceny
conviction.' 6 3
As the reach of larceny expanded, the intent element of the crime
became increasingly important, whereas the requirement of a
taking of possession became less significant. As a result, the bar
against convicting a person who had initially obtained lawful
157. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW § 85; see
also WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES **229-43 (distinguishing between "simple"
larceny and "mixt or compound" larceny).
158. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 206 app. A, at 101 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1953); LAFAVE
& SCOTT, supranote 157, § 85; George P. Fletcher, The Metamorphosisof Larceny, 89 HARV.
L. REV. 469, 497-98 (1976).
159. See, e.g., GLANVILL, THE TREATISE ON THE LAwS AND CUSTOMS OF THE REALM OF
ENGLAND COMMONLY CALLED GLANvILL 128-29 (G.D.G. Hall ed., 1965); Carrier's Case, Y.B.
13 Edw. 4, fol. 9, Pasch, pl. 5 (1473), reprinted in 2 SELDEN SOCIETY 30, 30-31 (M. Hemmant
ed., 1948).
160. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 206 app. A, at 101 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1953).
161. See, e.g., 3 W.S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 364-65 (3d ed., 1923).
162. (1678) 83 Eng. Rep. 142, 142-43 (K.B.).
163. Id.

2007]

MORALITY OF PROPERTY

1887

possession of property faded. In King v. Pear, for instance, a
defendant who had lied about his address and ultimate destination
when renting a horse was found guilty of larceny for later converting the horse." Because of the fraudulent misrepresentation,
the court reasoned, the defendant had never obtained legal possession.'6 5 Thus, "larceny by trick" was born. 6
Later cases went even further, often ignoring that a defendant
had initially obtained possession lawfully, and instead focussing on
his later intent. 167 The crime of larceny then encompassed not only
situations in which the defendant initially obtained property by a
taking from possession, but many situations where an individual,
possessing the requisite intent, exercised control over property
inconsistent with the continued rights of the owner.'68 As a result of
this evolutionary process, the scope of the crime of larceny expanded
to such an extent that protecting the peace could no longer provide
a plausible justification. Instead, larceny clearly was designed to
protect the general security of property rights. 6 9
Today, penal statutes and case law tend to focus on the actor's
70
intent and the exercise of dominion and control over the property.
The owner's consent to transfer of possession does not preclude a
conviction for larceny. If the defendant exercises dominion and
control wholly inconsistent with the continued rights of the owner,
164. (1779) 168 Eng. Rep. 208, 209 (K.B.).
165. Id.; see also King v. Semple, (1785) 168 Eng. Rep. 312, 313-14 (K.B.) (citing King v.
Pear); 1 WILLIAM HAWKINS, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 135 n.1 (Thomas Leach ed., 6th ed. 1787)
(defining larceny using the case of the rented horse as an example).
166. See JEROME HALL, THEFT, LAW AND SOCIETY 40 (2d ed. 1952).
167. See, e.g., Queen v. Middleton, (1873) 2 L.R.C.C.R. 38 (holding that transfer by mistake
is inoperative, and that no property passed); Queen v. Ashwell, (1885) 16 Q.B.D. 190 (holding
that man who kept a sovereign mistakenly loaned in place of a shilling was not guilty of
larceny as a bailee, but splitting on whether he was guilty of larceny at common law).
168. Parliament also played a role in this development. Thus, for example, in 1857 a
statute extended larceny to all conversions by bailees. An Act To Make Better Provision for
the Punishment of Frauds Committed by Trustees, Bankers, and Other Persons Intrusted
with Property, 20 & 21 Vict., c. 54 (1857) (Eng.).
169. LAFAVE & SCOTT, supranote 157, § 84; Fletcher, supra note 158, at 519-20.
170. See, e.g., People v. Baker, 6 N.E.2d 665, 668 (Ill. 1937) (holding that larceny is
complete when control is shifted to the thief with the intent to steal); People v. Alamo, 315
N.E.2d 446, 450 (N.Y. 1974) (noting that "unauthorized use" statute is not different from
larceny in terms of means used to effect taking); People v. Britto, 402 N.Y.S.2d 546 (N.Y.
Crim. Ct. 1978) (denying motion to dismiss shoplifting case in which defendant had not yet
left the store).
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and otherwise manifests the requisite culpable state of mind to
establish criminality, a larceny has occurred. Thus, for example,
shoplifting is a crime, without regard to whether the shoplifter
succeeds in depriving the shop owner of possession of the goods in
question.' 7 '
In addition to larceny, persons who damage, but do not take,
personal property can be charged today with the crime of criminal
mischief.172 Purposely destroying property worth more than $5000
is a felony punishable by imprisonment.'73 This type of punishment
is a clear indication of moral condemnation.
Real property crimes reflect a similar, if less dramatic pattern.
Traditionally, real property offences were confined to actions that
threatened buildings or occupied structures, and thus could
plausibly be said to jeopardize persons found in these structures.
The crime of arson, for example, is defined as causing a fire or
explosion that destroys "a building or occupied structure of
another,"'' 4 and is subject to very severe penalties. The crime of
burglary occurs when a person "enters a building or occupied
structure, or separately secured or occupied portion thereof, with
purpose to commit a crime therein, unless the premises are at the
time open to the public or the actor is licensed or privileged to
enter." 7 5 It too is a felony subject to severe penalties. 7 ' The
penalties for criminal trespass are also frequently more severe if the
trespass involves a building or occupied structure. 7 This overall
pattern also led earlier commentators to suggest that the criminal
law is systematically more concerned with protection of persons
than protection of property, because occupied structures by definition include persons, and persons are more likely to be found in
buildings.' v
But the law has not stopped at criminalizing real property
offences that threaten personal security. Trespass to land is
171. See, e.g., People v. Olivo, 420 N.E.2d 40 (N.Y. 1981) (involving defendants who were
suspiciously concealing goods before leaving the store).
172. MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.3(l)(a) (1962).
173. Id. §§ 6.06(3), 220.3(2).
174. Id. § 220.1(1).
175. Id.
176. Id. § 221.1(2).
177. Id. § 221.2(1).
178. See LAFAVE, supra note 155, at 1078.
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nowadays a crime in every jurisdiction, although often only 17a9
misdemeanor if the trespass occurs on land that is unoccupied.
Criminal mischief also applies to real property, and for willful and
malicious damage over a threshold value is a felony punishable by
imprisonment."8 Thus, we see general movement in the direction of
expanding criminal sanctions for interferences with rights to land,
even in circumstances that pose no plausible threat to personal
security. This too confirms that unlicensed interferences with
property are perceived to be morally wrong, without regard to
whether such interferences threaten other values such as the
sanctity of persons.
In short, the history of property crimes broadly supports the
proposition that core property rights are regarded as moral rights.
Although criminal law sometimes is used for purely instrumental
purposes, certainly the long history of criminalization of property
crimes is related in substantial measure to popular moral beliefs.
Moreover, the scope of criminalization of property offenses strongly
suggests the invasion or taking of property is itself regarded as
morally wrong, without regard to whether other moral interests,
such as the interest in protecting bodily security or preserving the
peace, also are implicated.
F. The Dominance of "PropertyRule" Protection
The remedies for violations of core property rights also partake of
a moral flavor. Many have remarked on how property law employs
property rules and sanctions, rather than liability rules and prices,
far more than one might expect under some efficiency-based
theories. 8 ' Some of the explanations for the law's reliance on
property rules track the reasons we have offered for why property
must be moral as well as legal. The more that property rights must
179. Id. at 1036.
180. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 806.13(1)(a), (3) (West 2006); MONT. CODEANN. § 45-6-101
(2005).
181. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 61, 2092 (arguing that undercompensation concerns
usually outweigh holdout problems, making property rules dominant); Carol M. Rose, The
Shadow of The Cathedral, 106 YALE L.J. 2175, 2194-97 (1997) (analyzing liability under
average harm rule as a common-pool problem in some circumstances); Henry E. Smith,
Property and Property Rules, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1719 (2004) (arguing for information cost
advantages of property rules).
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be respected by a large, heterogeneous, and unconnected group of
dutyholders, the more we should expect the remedy to be a simple
one."8 ' Exclusion by its nature protects a wide variety of uses, and
the signal for violation is a simple on/off signal easily perceived by
all-a boundary crossing in the case of land. Respecting the
autonomy of the owner and the delegation of authority to the owner
to choose among uses requires robust protection. A property rule
does just that.1 83
Property rules also can be viewed as sanctions; once a violation
occurs, the liability cost to the violator jumps from zero to a
supracompensatory amount. '3 By contrast, a liability rule or a price
tries to tailor liability costs to the amount of harm inflicted in a
particular case. Interestingly, a sanction is also reserved for
behavior that is not permitted--often because it is viewed as
morally wrong. A sanction is designed, theoretically, to deter
completely rather than to hold an actor in equipoise, 8 ' which is just
what we would expect of rights recognized by traditional morality.
Our brief survey has already revealed examples of the preference
for property rules. The court in Jacque imposed a supracompensatory penalty precisely to assure that the defendant would not
think property rights are subject to a "take and pay" regime,
however efficient this might be.' 8 6 The widespread demand for limits
on the use of eminent domain for private commercial development
reflects similar intuitions. In both contexts, we find a general
demand to preserve property rule protection for core property rights.
This demand reflects deep-seated moral as well as legal assumptions about the sanctity of property.
III. SITUATIONAL MORALITY AND NONCORE PROPERTY
Simple and robust everyday moral intuitions provide crucial
support for the core of property-the right to exclude from a thing,

182. Smith, supra note 181, at 1753-74.
183. See id. at 1754 ("[P]roperty rules are particularly suited to the protection of things
184. See Robert Cooter, Prices and Sanctions, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1523, 1523-24 (1984).
185. Id. at 1523.
186. See supranote 111-13 and accompanying text.
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good against the world. 8 7 This basic setup takes care of a lot of
problems but leaves many that must be solved in more nuanced
ways-"' The law of nuisance, landlord-tenant, future interests,
servitudes, trusts, private contracting, and regulation can at various
times soften and supplement exclusion rights. Such refinements
outside of the core of property respond to a wider range of moral
concerns, and entail judgments that reflect pragmatism, expert
knowledge, and balancing. Perhaps not surprisingly, these problems and their possible solutions have attracted a large-we would
say disproportionate-share of commentators' attention. Indeed,
starting with the Legal Realists, the dominant assumption has
been that the need to refine the exclusionary regime calls everything into question. A better view would be that efforts to supplement exclusion with various devices governing proper use respond
to moral considerations that supplement those backing exclusion,
but that exclusion retains its presumptive moral and legal force.
The relation of foundation and refinement is reflected deep in the
structure of the law of possession and the role that causation
plays in property law. Precisely because entitlements retain a
morally-grounded bedrock of exclusion rights, the law does not
regard causation in resource conflicts agnostically. 8 9 Property
rights, like moral rights, are lumpy and give rise to strong intuitions
about who causes harm to whom, conditioned in property law on
spatial boundaries and things."9
The bundle of rights view gains some of its plausibility from the
fact that what we call property law covers a lot of ground. Not all of
property is about exclusion of all others from a thing. Some of
property law entails finely tailored regulations about use, and some
of property law governs use among a narrower class of people, such
as future interest holders, neighboring landowners, or even
contractual partners. 9 ' Uncontroversially, the right to exclude from
187. See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
188. There has been a need to allow, for example, airplane overflights and a host of less
obvious exceptions. See United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 260-61 (1946) (asserting that
the ancient ad coelum doctrine "has no place in the modern world"); Hinman v. Pac. Air
Transp., 84 F.2d 755, 757 (9th Cir. 1936) (stating that ad coelum rule "is not the law, and that
it never was the law").
189. See supra notes 40-45 and accompanying text.
190. See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
191. See Merrill & Smith, supra note 38, at 394-97, 398; Smith, supranote 21, at 455-56.
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land does not include the right to exclude high-altitude airplane
flights. 9 2 Similarly, nuisance law permits some low-level invasions
and allows others to occur upon the payment of damages. Let us
briefly mention some other examples of how core property rights
give way in what we would regard as noncore circumstances.
Our first example is restraints on the future alienation of
property. The primacy of owner autonomy means that the law starts
with a broad presumption that owners can dispose of property as
they wish. They can retain it or sell it, or direct that it be transmitted on their death to Aunt Tilley or to the Society for the Prevention
of Cruelty to Animals. When owners attempt to restrict the
alienation of property for long periods after they have died, however,
the law steps in with restrictions. Here we find the familiar rules
against direct restraints on alienation, the Rule Against Perpetuities, and so forth. These can be seen either as efficiency constraints
on owner autonomy, or as constraints on owner autonomy reflecting
competing moral concerns about excessive dead hand control of
future generations. The main point we would make is that the basic
proposition--owner autonomy to dispose of property-looms large
and forms the basic foundation for understanding how property
works. Rules limiting restraints on alienation reflect a balancing of
owner autonomy with other competing concerns, but they come into
play only in relatively rare and extreme circumstances.
The law of trusts provides our second illustration. Trust law is
tremendously flexible and allows settlors to confer a wide range of
powers on trustees, who in turn can take into account a wide range
of circumstances affecting beneficiaries. In default of specific
instructions by the settlor, the law has developed a complex set of
fiduciary obligations that attach to trustees for resolving these
issues. All of this seems to reflect an intricate balancing of interests
that takes into account a variety of concerns beyond basic moral
See generally Smith, supra note 38.
192. See, e.g., Brown v. United States, 73 F.3d 1100, 1103-04 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Thomas W.
Merrill, Trespass,Nuisance, and the Costs of DeterminingPropertyRights, 14 J. LEGAL STUD.
13, 36 (1985). The Supreme Court has held that federal statutes have created a public
highway at certain minimum altitudes. Causby, 328 U.S. at 261. For a general discussion of
the various theories initially used to soften the ad coelum rule in the context of overflights and
subsequent statutory developments, see W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON
THE LAW OF TORTS § 13, at 79-82 (5th ed. 1984); Colin Cahoon, Low Altitude Airspace: A
PropertyRights No-Man's Land, 56 J. AIR L. & CoM. 157 (1990).
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intuitions about owner autonomy and the right to exclude. Nearly
always overlooked in legal accounts of trust law, however, is that
from the perspective of persons standing outside the triangular
relationship between settlor, trustee, and beneficiary, trust assets
look very much like ordinary property.1 93 The trustee retains legal
title to the trust assets, and can exercise nearly the same rights to
exclude, sell, develop, mortgage, or otherwise utilize the property
that an ordinary owner would have. An automobile owned by a
trust, for example, is subject to the same duties of abstention and
noninterference as any other owned automobile. We see how trust
law reflects an elaborate edifice governing the relationship among
settlor, trustee, and beneficiary, but from a larger perspective
retains with respect to trust assets the same core in rem attributes
we associate with nontrust property.
Landlord-tenant law furnishes a third illustration. The law
governing landlord and tenant relations is also notoriously complicated, and appears to reflect a number of tradeoffs that go far
beyond the basic moral intuitions surrounding the exclusion right.
For example, the implied warranty of habitability in residential
tenancies appears to reflect concern about asymmetric information
between landlords and tenants, as well as general moral intuitions
about the importance of assuring a minimal level of decent housing
for all renters, regardless of their ability to pay. As in the case of
trust law, however, the complexities and the balancing nearly all
pertain to the bilateral relationship between the landlord and the
tenant. As far as people standing outside this relationship are
concerned, the critical aspect of landlord-tenant law is simply that
the landlord has transferred possession to the tenant for the
duration of the lease. This means that the tenant, not the landlord,
is now empowered to act as gatekeeper of the leased premises,
exercising the right to exclude, deciding who to include, and for most
purposes determining how the property will be used. Thus, landlordtenant law also does not fundamentally alter the core aspect of
property, insofar as relations between the person uniquely entitled
to possession and the rest of the world are concerned. Landlordtenant law provides yet another example of how core rights of
193. See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Property/ContractInterface, 101
COLUM. L. REv. 773, 843-49 (2001).
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exclusion provide the foundation for understanding the institution
of property. Complexities of intense interest to a small number of
concerned actors are erected on top of this foundation, but they do
not alter the fundamental nature of property insofar as it applies to
all other actors in the community.
As these examples suggest, property may rest on a foundation of
exclusion that as a first cut takes care of a vast number of coordination problems among many unconnected and anonymous parties.
Property law also engages in fine-tuning this picture. In these
noncore areas of property, prudential considerations supplement, or
even sometimes override, the core exclusionary aspects of property
that rest on ordinary morality. Yet it does not appear that the more
complex picture that emerges when we consider this fine-tuning
calls into question the analysis of the importance of the core, or the
centrality of morality in maintaining the core.
CONCLUSION

As an in rem coordination device, property depends on morality.
The core of property depends on robust and automatic prelegal
intuitions that it is wrong to violate property rights, especially by
stealing, crossing boundaries, and interfering with possession.
Property may serve utilitarian ends but in order to serve its basic
in rem function property cannot be reducible to case-by-case
pragmatic calculation of those ends. Like civil and human rights,
which are also in rem, property rights must draw on morality. This
dependence of property law on morality can be seen in the foundational role of possession and the asymmetry of basic exclusionary
entitlements. Even the move to refine the basic exclusionary
structure depends on a type of harm-based morality, most clearly in
the case of nuisance. Courts and ordinary observers alike condemn
violations of property rights-such as trespasses, bad faith adverse
possession, takings for economic development, and nonviolent
property crimes-and are reluctant to treat those acting in bad faith
as favorably as those who are laboring under an excusable mistake.
These points establish, we believe, that property rights must be
moral rights if they are to exist at all, and that the moral right to
property is not qualitatively different from those moral rights we
describe as human or civil rights. We do not claim more. We do not
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offer here a specific moral theory of property rights expressed in
nonutilitarian terms, such as Locke or Hegel sought to develop. Nor
do we claim that property must be regarded as being a moral right
on the same plane as other moral rights. One quite possibly could
develop a coherent moral philosophy that would put the moral right
to property on a lower (or conceivably higher) plane than the moral
rights associated with human or civil rights. What we do claim is
that property cannot exist if property is not regarded as a moral
right, and that the morality of property will-if only for information
cost and collective action reasons-partake of the nature of
deontological commands to a much greater degree than situational
pragmatism would seem to suggest. These reasons of information
cost and collective action provide a justification for those aspects of
property that have been seen as most consistent with deontological
views such as corrective justice.

